Port of Antwerp — hackers release containers (2011-2013)
2011-2013 · Antwerp, BE. A public, sourced maritime cyber case.
At a glance: who, what, when, where, impact, type
Six facts, taken from the public sources below. Nothing here is inferred.
Who
What
When
Where
Impact
Type
Incident types in this case. Each button opens our threat page: what it is, how it spreads, how to recover.
What happens in this kind of case
A criminal intrusion into a terminal does not want the system down. It wants the system to work, silently, for the wrong people. It starts like any other attack, with a phishing e-mail and a piece of malware on an office computer; when that door is closed, it comes back through a physical one, with a device plugged into a free network socket inside the terminal.
From there the target is the release: who may collect which container, when, with which PIN. A release that looks normal to the clerk, the gate and the trucker is exactly what the attacker is buying. Nothing crashes, nothing alerts, and the first sign is a container that left before its owner came for it.
Antwerp 2011-2013 is the case that taught ports that release integrity must itself be a detection subject, and that a free socket inside the terminal is a door.

What to do, and what we recommend
Four measures that would have changed those two years for any container terminal. Each one opens the page where we explain how.
There will always be problems. The question is whether you see them.
Nothing crashed and nothing alerted, for two years. A SIEM that reads the terminal operating system is what turns a normal-looking release into a question somebody asks the same day. Do you have yours?

Report an incident, in confidence
Ongoing or past, suspected or confirmed: a human reads it, and we call you back within 15 minutes during office hours when it is still running. Logs and screenshots can follow by email.

Sources, as published
We keep only what the sources say. Dates and sites are those of the original articles.

The Register · 18 June 2013
Drug gang hacks into Belgian seaport, cops seize tonne of heroin

SecurityWeek · 2013
Drug traffickers hacked shipping systems to track large drug shipments
Every public incident on the map
18 public, sourced cyber incidents across global ports and carriers, 2011 to 2026. Open any card for the full story and its public source.
2011-2013 · Antwerp, BE · Criminal intrusion
June 2017 · Copenhagen (HQ) — worldwide, DK · Collateral malware
May 2020 · Bandar Abbas, IR · Nation-state intrusion
Jan + May 2020 · Melbourne, AU · Ransomware
July 2021 · Durban, ZA · Ransomware
Aug-Sep 2021 · Houston, US · Nation-state intrusion
February 2022 · Antwerp / Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp + German coast, BE · Ransomware
February 2022 · Nhava Sheva (Mumbai), IN · Ransomware
December 2022 · Lisbon, PT · Ransomware
April 2023 · Montreal, CA · Hacktivist DDoS
July 2023 · Nagoya, JP · Ransomware
November 2023 · Melbourne, AU · Criminal intrusion
August 2024 · Seattle, US · Ransomware
November 2026 · Copenhagen (HQ) — isolated subsidiary system, DK · Criminal intrusion
2022-2023 (public figures) · Los Angeles, US · Threat pressure (not a breach)
When one port sees a threat, every member is warned.
The Port Cyber Alliance turns one port’s incident into every member’s early warning. Join the alliance and share the signal.

