Shahid Rajaee port, Iran (May 2020)
May 2020 · Bandar Abbas, IR. A public, sourced maritime cyber case.
At a glance: who, what, when, where, impact, type
Six facts, taken from the public sources below. Nothing here is inferred.
Who
What
When
Where
Impact
Type
Incident types in this case. Each button opens our threat page: what it is, how it spreads, how to recover.
What happens in this kind of case
A nation-state intrusion into a port is not after money. It is after the one thing a port cannot hide: the queue. The target is the system that decides which truck enters, which vessel berths and which container moves. When it stops, the effect is visible from a satellite within hours: trucks on the roads, ships at anchor, a country's trade stalled at one gate.
There is no ransom note and no criminal to arrest. The port learns what happened from the press, weeks later, and the answer about who did it comes from foreign officials, not from its own logs.
May 2020 is the case that showed ports they can be a target for reasons that have nothing to do with their own business, and that the traffic around a port is part of what an attack can stop.

What to do, and what we recommend
Four measures that would have changed the week of 9 May 2020 for any port, whatever the attacker's motive. Each one opens the page where we explain how.
There will always be problems. The question is whether you see them.
A port that learns from the press what happened to it has no logs to answer with. A SIEM is what lets you tell the story yourself, the same day. Do you have yours?

Report an incident, in confidence
Ongoing or past, suspected or confirmed: a human reads it, and we call you back within 15 minutes during office hours when it is still running. Logs and screenshots can follow by email.

Sources, as published
We keep only what the sources say. Dates and sites are those of the original articles.

Al Jazeera · 19 May 2020
Israel cyberattack caused 'total disarray' at Iran port: Report

The Jerusalem Post · 19 May 2020
Cyber warfare, Israel, Iran and the new way of total war (citing The Washington Post)
Every public incident on the map
18 public, sourced cyber incidents across global ports and carriers, 2011 to 2026. Open any card for the full story and its public source.
2011-2013 · Antwerp, BE · Criminal intrusion
June 2017 · Copenhagen (HQ) — worldwide, DK · Collateral malware
May 2020 · Bandar Abbas, IR · Nation-state intrusion
Jan + May 2020 · Melbourne, AU · Ransomware
July 2021 · Durban, ZA · Ransomware
Aug-Sep 2021 · Houston, US · Nation-state intrusion
February 2022 · Antwerp / Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp + German coast, BE · Ransomware
February 2022 · Nhava Sheva (Mumbai), IN · Ransomware
December 2022 · Lisbon, PT · Ransomware
April 2023 · Montreal, CA · Hacktivist DDoS
July 2023 · Nagoya, JP · Ransomware
November 2023 · Melbourne, AU · Criminal intrusion
August 2024 · Seattle, US · Ransomware
November 2026 · Copenhagen (HQ) — isolated subsidiary system, DK · Criminal intrusion
2022-2023 (public figures) · Los Angeles, US · Threat pressure (not a breach)
When one port sees a threat, every member is warned.
The Port Cyber Alliance turns one port’s incident into every member’s early warning. Join the alliance and share the signal.
