COSCO Shipping Lines, Americas (July 2018)
July 2018 · Long Beach, US. A public, sourced maritime cyber case.
At a glance: who, what, when, where, impact, type
Six facts, taken from the public sources below. Nothing here is inferred.
Who
What
When
Where
Impact
Type
Incident types in this case. Each button opens our threat page: what it is, how it spreads, how to recover.
What happens in this kind of case
When a shipping line's office network goes down, the first casualties are e-mail and telephone, and the terminal keeps working only if it was built apart. Bookings, customer service and documentation stop answering; agents fall back to personal phones and public web forms; the line publishes a notice that vessel operations are unaffected.
What decides the week is the boundary between the corporate network and the terminal systems: where it exists and is enforced, cargo keeps moving while the office is rebuilt; where it does not, the terminal operating system is the next thing to stop.
COSCO in July 2018 is the public case where that boundary held: a regional office outage, days of degraded communications, and a terminal that kept running on its own system.

What to do, and what we recommend
Four measures that would have changed the week of 24 July 2018 for any line or terminal. Each one opens the page where we explain how.
There will always be problems. The question is whether you see them.
The terminal kept running because its system was separate. A SIEM is what shows you, every day, that the separation still holds and that nothing is moving across it. Do you have yours?

Report an incident, in confidence
Ongoing or past, suspected or confirmed: a human reads it, and we call you back within 15 minutes during office hours when it is still running. Logs and screenshots can follow by email.

Sources, as published
We keep only what the sources say. Dates and sites are those of the original articles.

The Maritime Executive · 25 July 2018
COSCO reports IT outage in the Americas (article no longer online at its original address; cited as published)
Every public incident on the map
18 public, sourced cyber incidents across global ports and carriers, 2011 to 2026. Open any card for the full story and its public source.
2011-2013 · Antwerp, BE · Criminal intrusion
June 2017 · Copenhagen (HQ) — worldwide, DK · Collateral malware
May 2020 · Bandar Abbas, IR · Nation-state intrusion
Jan + May 2020 · Melbourne, AU · Ransomware
July 2021 · Durban, ZA · Ransomware
Aug-Sep 2021 · Houston, US · Nation-state intrusion
February 2022 · Antwerp / Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp + German coast, BE · Ransomware
February 2022 · Nhava Sheva (Mumbai), IN · Ransomware
December 2022 · Lisbon, PT · Ransomware
April 2023 · Montreal, CA · Hacktivist DDoS
July 2023 · Nagoya, JP · Ransomware
November 2023 · Melbourne, AU · Criminal intrusion
August 2024 · Seattle, US · Ransomware
November 2026 · Copenhagen (HQ) — isolated subsidiary system, DK · Criminal intrusion
2022-2023 (public figures) · Los Angeles, US · Threat pressure (not a breach)
When one port sees a threat, every member is warned.
The Port Cyber Alliance turns one port’s incident into every member’s early warning. Join the alliance and share the signal.

