Port of San Diego (September 2018)
September 2018 · San Diego, US. A public, sourced maritime cyber case.
At a glance: who, what, when, where, impact, type
Six facts, taken from the public sources below. Nothing here is inferred.
Who
What
When
Where
Impact
Type
Incident types in this case. Each button opens our threat page: what it is, how it spreads, how to recover.
What happens in this kind of case
When ransomware hits the administrative side of a port authority, ships keep moving and the public stops being served. The encryption lands on office computers: permits, records, invoicing, e-mail. The quays, the pilots and the terminals run on other systems and other networks, so the first public message is reassuring: operations are not affected.
The real cost shows up in the following weeks: services to the public delivered by hand or not at all, staff rebuilding machines, an investigation with federal agencies, and a question nobody can answer on day one: did the attacker only reach the office network, or did they look further?
San Diego, days after Barcelona, is the case that made port authorities ask whether their administrative IT deserved the same attention as their operational systems.

What to do, and what we recommend
Four measures that would have changed the week of 25 September 2018 for any port authority. Each one opens the page where we explain how.
There will always be problems. The question is whether you see them.
Operations were not affected, the port said. A SIEM is what lets a port authority say it with evidence, hours after the first alert rather than weeks after the investigation. Do you have yours?

Report an incident, in confidence
Ongoing or past, suspected or confirmed: a human reads it, and we call you back within 15 minutes during office hours when it is still running. Logs and screenshots can follow by email.

Sources, as published
We keep only what the sources say. Dates and sites are those of the original articles.

Security Affairs · 27 September 2018
Port of San Diego hit by a ransomware-based cyber attack
Every public incident on the map
18 public, sourced cyber incidents across global ports and carriers, 2011 to 2026. Open any card for the full story and its public source.
2011-2013 · Antwerp, BE · Criminal intrusion
June 2017 · Copenhagen (HQ) — worldwide, DK · Collateral malware
May 2020 · Bandar Abbas, IR · Nation-state intrusion
Jan + May 2020 · Melbourne, AU · Ransomware
July 2021 · Durban, ZA · Ransomware
Aug-Sep 2021 · Houston, US · Nation-state intrusion
February 2022 · Antwerp / Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp + German coast, BE · Ransomware
February 2022 · Nhava Sheva (Mumbai), IN · Ransomware
December 2022 · Lisbon, PT · Ransomware
April 2023 · Montreal, CA · Hacktivist DDoS
July 2023 · Nagoya, JP · Ransomware
November 2023 · Melbourne, AU · Criminal intrusion
August 2024 · Seattle, US · Ransomware
November 2026 · Copenhagen (HQ) — isolated subsidiary system, DK · Criminal intrusion
2022-2023 (public figures) · Los Angeles, US · Threat pressure (not a breach)
When one port sees a threat, every member is warned.
The Port Cyber Alliance turns one port’s incident into every member’s early warning. Join the alliance and share the signal.

