Toll Group — ransomware twice in three months (2020)
Jan + May 2020 · Melbourne, AU. A public, sourced maritime cyber case.
At a glance: who, what, when, where, impact, type
Six facts, taken from the public sources below. Nothing here is inferred.
Who
What
When
Where
Impact
Type
Incident types in this case. Each button opens our threat page: what it is, how it spreads, how to recover.
What happens in this kind of case
Being hit once does not inoculate you. A second ransomware group reads the news too. The first attack disables the IT systems and the recovery takes weeks; while the company rebuilds, a second crew, with a different strain, finds the doors that were reopened in a hurry, or never closed.
The second wave is worse because it adds exfiltration: contracts, employee files, customer data copied out before the encryption, then published piece by piece on a leak site to pressure a company that has said it will not pay. A no-pay stance is right, and it needs a data-exfiltration plan behind it: what was taken, who must be told, when.
Toll Group in 2020 is the case that showed the freight chain it is as much a target as a port, and that segmentation and tested restores, not luck, decide the recovery time.

What to do, and what we recommend
Four measures that would have changed the first half of 2020 for any freight operator or port. Each one opens the page where we explain how.
There will always be problems. The question is whether you see them.
Twice in three months, by two different crews. A SIEM is what sees the second one come in through the door the first one left open. Do you have yours?

Report an incident, in confidence
Ongoing or past, suspected or confirmed: a human reads it, and we call you back within 15 minutes during office hours when it is still running. Logs and screenshots can follow by email.

Sources, as published
We keep only what the sources say. Dates and sites are those of the original articles.

The Register · 6 May 2020
Transport biz Toll Group suffers second ransomware infection in just three months
Every public incident on the map
18 public, sourced cyber incidents across global ports and carriers, 2011 to 2026. Open any card for the full story and its public source.
2011-2013 · Antwerp, BE · Criminal intrusion
June 2017 · Copenhagen (HQ) — worldwide, DK · Collateral malware
May 2020 · Bandar Abbas, IR · Nation-state intrusion
Jan + May 2020 · Melbourne, AU · Ransomware
July 2021 · Durban, ZA · Ransomware
Aug-Sep 2021 · Houston, US · Nation-state intrusion
February 2022 · Antwerp / Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp + German coast, BE · Ransomware
February 2022 · Nhava Sheva (Mumbai), IN · Ransomware
December 2022 · Lisbon, PT · Ransomware
April 2023 · Montreal, CA · Hacktivist DDoS
July 2023 · Nagoya, JP · Ransomware
November 2023 · Melbourne, AU · Criminal intrusion
August 2024 · Seattle, US · Ransomware
November 2026 · Copenhagen (HQ) — isolated subsidiary system, DK · Criminal intrusion
2022-2023 (public figures) · Los Angeles, US · Threat pressure (not a breach)
When one port sees a threat, every member is warned.
The Port Cyber Alliance turns one port’s incident into every member’s early warning. Join the alliance and share the signal.

