European oil terminals — ARA hub disrupted (February 2022)
February 2022 · Antwerp / Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp + German coast, BE. A public, sourced maritime cyber case.
At a glance: who, what, when, where, impact, type
Six facts, taken from the public sources below. Nothing here is inferred.
Who
What
When
Where
Impact
Type
Incident types in this case. Each button opens our threat page: what it is, how it spreads, how to recover.
What happens in this kind of case
When sister sites share the same software, one compromise is a multi-country outage. The ransomware lands on the systems that schedule barges and tankers, measure tanks and release product; the same build runs in Antwerp, Amsterdam and on the German coast, so the same week the same screens go dark in three countries.
Loading and discharge do not stop for lack of product, they stop for lack of paperwork and measurements the systems used to produce. Barges queue, tankers wait, traders reroute, and the recovery is counted in days per site.
February 2022 is the case that showed ports that storage and energy nodes are part of the maritime attack surface, not a separate world, and that shared software across sister sites deserves its own risk line.

What to do, and what we recommend
Four measures that would have changed the first week of February 2022 for any storage operator or port. Each one opens the page where we explain how.
There will always be problems. The question is whether you see them.
Three countries, dozens of sites, one week of delays. A SIEM that watches every site is what lets the first one warn the others. Do you have yours?

Report an incident, in confidence
Ongoing or past, suspected or confirmed: a human reads it, and we call you back within 15 minutes during office hours when it is still running. Logs and screenshots can follow by email.

Sources, as published
We keep only what the sources say. Dates and sites are those of the original articles.

gCaptain / Reuters · 3 February 2022
Oil shipments in European oil hub delayed after cyber attacks
Every public incident on the map
18 public, sourced cyber incidents across global ports and carriers, 2011 to 2026. Open any card for the full story and its public source.
2011-2013 · Antwerp, BE · Criminal intrusion
June 2017 · Copenhagen (HQ) — worldwide, DK · Collateral malware
May 2020 · Bandar Abbas, IR · Nation-state intrusion
Jan + May 2020 · Melbourne, AU · Ransomware
July 2021 · Durban, ZA · Ransomware
Aug-Sep 2021 · Houston, US · Nation-state intrusion
February 2022 · Antwerp / Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp + German coast, BE · Ransomware
February 2022 · Nhava Sheva (Mumbai), IN · Ransomware
December 2022 · Lisbon, PT · Ransomware
April 2023 · Montreal, CA · Hacktivist DDoS
July 2023 · Nagoya, JP · Ransomware
November 2023 · Melbourne, AU · Criminal intrusion
August 2024 · Seattle, US · Ransomware
November 2026 · Copenhagen (HQ) — isolated subsidiary system, DK · Criminal intrusion
2022-2023 (public figures) · Los Angeles, US · Threat pressure (not a breach)
When one port sees a threat, every member is warned.
The Port Cyber Alliance turns one port’s incident into every member’s early warning. Join the alliance and share the signal.

