NotPetya stops a global carrier group (June 2017)
June 2017 · Copenhagen (HQ) — worldwide, DK. A public, sourced maritime cyber case.
At a glance: who, what, when, where, impact, type
Six facts, taken from the public source below. Nothing here is inferred.
Who
What
When
Where
Impact
Type
Incident types in this case. Each button opens our threat page: what it is, how it spreads, how to recover.
What happens in this kind of case
A collateral malware outbreak does not knock at the door: it is already inside, carried by a software update or a trusted connection, and it moves on its own. Within hours every Windows machine it can reach is unusable: booking, terminal operating systems, gate kiosks, e-mail, the phone directory. There is no ransom to negotiate and nobody to call.
The question that decides the following weeks is the one nobody asked before: do we have a copy of our domain, our configurations and our data that was not connected to the network when it happened, and how many days does it take to rebuild from it?
June 2017 is the case every port remembers: a global carrier group reverted to paper, terminals on several continents stopped, and the bill was counted in hundreds of millions.

What to do, and what we recommend
Four measures that would have changed the summer of 2017 for any terminal or carrier, target or not. Each one opens the page where we explain how.
There will always be problems. The question is whether you see them.
A worm moves faster than a phone call. A SIEM is what sees the first infected machine and the second, before the terminal gates stop. Do you have yours?

Report an incident, in confidence
Ongoing or past, suspected or confirmed: a human reads it, and we call you back within 15 minutes during office hours when it is still running. Logs and screenshots can follow by email.

Sources, as published
We keep only what the sources say. Dates and sites are those of the original articles.

CNBC · 16 August 2017
Shipping company Maersk says June cyberattack could cost it up to $300 million
Every public incident on the map
18 public, sourced cyber incidents across global ports and carriers, 2011 to 2026. Open any card for the full story and its public source.
2011-2013 · Antwerp, BE · Criminal intrusion
June 2017 · Copenhagen (HQ) — worldwide, DK · Collateral malware
May 2020 · Bandar Abbas, IR · Nation-state intrusion
Jan + May 2020 · Melbourne, AU · Ransomware
July 2021 · Durban, ZA · Ransomware
Aug-Sep 2021 · Houston, US · Nation-state intrusion
February 2022 · Antwerp / Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp + German coast, BE · Ransomware
February 2022 · Nhava Sheva (Mumbai), IN · Ransomware
December 2022 · Lisbon, PT · Ransomware
April 2023 · Montreal, CA · Hacktivist DDoS
July 2023 · Nagoya, JP · Ransomware
November 2023 · Melbourne, AU · Criminal intrusion
August 2024 · Seattle, US · Ransomware
November 2026 · Copenhagen (HQ) — isolated subsidiary system, DK · Criminal intrusion
2022-2023 (public figures) · Los Angeles, US · Threat pressure (not a breach)
When one port sees a threat, every member is warned.
The Port Cyber Alliance turns one port’s incident into every member’s early warning. Join the alliance and share the signal.
