Port of Nagoya — ransomware stops container terminals (July 2023)
July 2023 · Nagoya, JP. A public, sourced maritime cyber case.
At a glance: who, what, when, where, impact, type
Six facts, taken from the public sources below. Nothing here is inferred.
Who
What
When
Where
Impact
Type
Incident types in this case. Each button opens our threat page: what it is, how it spreads, how to recover.
What happens in this kind of case
When one system controls every container terminal in a port, the ransomware does not stop a terminal. It stops the port. The encryption lands on the unified system at night; by morning the ransom note is printing on every office printer, the gates are closed and the trucks are queuing on the road.
The clock that matters starts there and stops at the first truck through the gate. Two and a half days is what it took in Nagoya, with a decision not to pay and a restoration from backups. The recovery time was decided months before, by where the backups were, who the admins were, and whether a manual mode had been written down.
July 2023 is the case that showed ports that a shared system is a shared single point of failure, that recovery time is the metric, and that the manual mode is a business decision taken in writing before the incident.

What to do, and what we recommend
Four measures that would have shortened the two and a half days of July 2023 for any port with a shared terminal system. Each one opens the page where we explain how.
There will always be problems. The question is whether you see them.
The ransom note on the printers was the first alert. A SIEM is what gives you the one before it, the night before, while the gates are still open. Do you have yours?

Report an incident, in confidence
Ongoing or past, suspected or confirmed: a human reads it, and we call you back within 15 minutes during office hours when it is still running. Logs and screenshots can follow by email.

Sources, as published
We keep only what the sources say. Dates and sites are those of the original articles.

The Maritime Executive · July 2023
Ransomware attack stops container operations at Japan's Nagoya port
Every public incident on the map
18 public, sourced cyber incidents across global ports and carriers, 2011 to 2026. Open any card for the full story and its public source.
2011-2013 · Antwerp, BE · Criminal intrusion
June 2017 · Copenhagen (HQ) — worldwide, DK · Collateral malware
May 2020 · Bandar Abbas, IR · Nation-state intrusion
Jan + May 2020 · Melbourne, AU · Ransomware
July 2021 · Durban, ZA · Ransomware
Aug-Sep 2021 · Houston, US · Nation-state intrusion
February 2022 · Antwerp / Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp + German coast, BE · Ransomware
February 2022 · Nhava Sheva (Mumbai), IN · Ransomware
December 2022 · Lisbon, PT · Ransomware
April 2023 · Montreal, CA · Hacktivist DDoS
July 2023 · Nagoya, JP · Ransomware
November 2023 · Melbourne, AU · Criminal intrusion
August 2024 · Seattle, US · Ransomware
November 2026 · Copenhagen (HQ) — isolated subsidiary system, DK · Criminal intrusion
2022-2023 (public figures) · Los Angeles, US · Threat pressure (not a breach)
When one port sees a threat, every member is warned.
The Port Cyber Alliance turns one port’s incident into every member’s early warning. Join the alliance and share the signal.

