DP World Australia — four ports, one response (November 2023)
November 2023 · Melbourne, AU. A public, sourced maritime cyber case.
At a glance: who, what, when, where, impact, type
Six facts, taken from the public sources below. Nothing here is inferred.
Who
What
When
Where
Impact
Type
Incident types in this case. Each button opens our threat page: what it is, how it spreads, how to recover.
What happens in this kind of case
Disconnecting to contain an attack can itself stop the terminal, unless a manual mode is ready. The intrusion is detected on a Friday; someone with written authority pulls the plug on the shared platform, and four terminals in four cities go quiet together, because the unit of isolation is the platform, not the site.
The quay can keep working for a while; the gate cannot, because the gate is where the platform talks to the truckers, the customs broker and the shipping line. Thirty thousand containers wait on three days of silence, while the operator says on day one what it knows and what it does not.
November 2023 is the case that showed terminal operators what a multi-site response looks like when it is done properly, and what it costs when the manual mode for the gate is not ready.

What to do, and what we recommend
Four measures that would have shortened the three days of November 2023 for any multi-site operator. Each one opens the page where we explain how.
There will always be problems. The question is whether you see them.
Pulling the plug stopped four terminals for three days. A SIEM is what lets you see the intrusion early enough to isolate one site instead of the whole country. Do you have yours?

Report an incident, in confidence
Ongoing or past, suspected or confirmed: a human reads it, and we call you back within 15 minutes during office hours when it is still running. Logs and screenshots can follow by email.

Sources, as published
We keep only what the sources say. Dates and sites are those of the original articles.

The Record · 13 November 2023
Australian ports operator recovering after major cyber incident
Every public incident on the map
18 public, sourced cyber incidents across global ports and carriers, 2011 to 2026. Open any card for the full story and its public source.
2011-2013 · Antwerp, BE · Criminal intrusion
June 2017 · Copenhagen (HQ) — worldwide, DK · Collateral malware
May 2020 · Bandar Abbas, IR · Nation-state intrusion
Jan + May 2020 · Melbourne, AU · Ransomware
July 2021 · Durban, ZA · Ransomware
Aug-Sep 2021 · Houston, US · Nation-state intrusion
February 2022 · Antwerp / Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp + German coast, BE · Ransomware
February 2022 · Nhava Sheva (Mumbai), IN · Ransomware
December 2022 · Lisbon, PT · Ransomware
April 2023 · Montreal, CA · Hacktivist DDoS
July 2023 · Nagoya, JP · Ransomware
November 2023 · Melbourne, AU · Criminal intrusion
August 2024 · Seattle, US · Ransomware
November 2026 · Copenhagen (HQ) — isolated subsidiary system, DK · Criminal intrusion
2022-2023 (public figures) · Los Angeles, US · Threat pressure (not a breach)
When one port sees a threat, every member is warned.
The Port Cyber Alliance turns one port’s incident into every member’s early warning. Join the alliance and share the signal.

